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Despite the increasing importance of variable renewable power generation, baseload, that
is stable and predictable power generators, remain the backbone of many countries’ power
systems. We here compare CSP (concentrating solar power) and nuclear power as baseload
electricity providers for the case of South Africa, which is adding significant new generation
capacity, has an abundant solar resource, but also one existing and additional planned nu-
clear power plants. Both of these technologies are considered baseload-capable with suffi-
cient available fuel (sunlight or fissible material) to provide large amounts of nearly emissions-
free electricity. We find that under a range of technological learning assumptions, CSP com-
pares favorably against nuclear on costs in the period to 2030, and has lower investment
and environmental risks. The results suggest that while nuclear power may be an important
low-emissions power technology in regions with little sun, in the case of South Africa, CSP
could be capable of providing a stable baseload supply at lower cost than nuclear power,
and may have other non-cost benefits.
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1. Introduction
The energy sector is undergoing significant change, driven in particular by the need for a
cleaner energy supply to help mitigate climate change. For example, many countries have
put in place ambitious targets to increase their share of renewable energy (Martinot et al.,
2007). Traditionally, the backbone of power systems has consisted of baseload providers:
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power plants able to provide a constant and predictable supply of electricity. However,
power systems relying on a combination of baseload (i.e., coal or nuclear) and variable (i.e.,
wind or solar photovoltaics/PV) generation are considered difficult to operate (Mez, 2012).
For the grid integration of variable renewables, flexible load-following rather than baseload
capabilities are required. Mai et al. (2014b) show for the U.S. case that integrating up to
about 50% or even up to 80% (Mai et al., 2014a) of variable wind and solar PV generation
is possible with a combination of measures such as more flexible generation capacity, grid-
scale storage, more transmission, more flexible loads, and changed systems operations. In
power systems with ever increasing shares of renewable generation, baseload power may
no longer even be a relevant concept. Budischak et al. (2013) demonstrate feasible systems
relying entirely on wind and solar power for up to 99% of the time (but these results rely
on the availability of affordable large-scale storage). Nevertheless, and despite the fact that
wind and PV generation costs are falling, traditional baseload generation can be expected
to remain relevant for some decades while the transition of power systems worldwide is
underway. In particular in emerging economies, where substantial demand increases are
taking place and large parts of a generation fleet relying on substantial baseload capacities
still have decades of operational life ahead of them, investment decisions taken between
now and 2030 will still take baseload generation into account.
The availability of low-emissions baseload generators is therefore still an immediate con-
cern. Two main options are usually considered: carbon capture and storage (CCS) and nu-
clear power. As yet, however, CCS remains unproven at a commercial scale, and the future
availability and costs of CCS-enabled power plants thus remain uncertain (Haszeldine, 2009).
In contrast, nuclear power is a mature technology with decades of experience, and in 2011,
delivered about 12% of total global electricity supply (IEA, 2013). It is advocated by many as
a low-emission power generation technology with sufficient fuel availability for large-scale
deployment, and thus potentially crucial to achieve deep reductions in greenhouse gas emis-
sions (e.g., Brook, 2012; Lovelock, 2007). However, nuclear is also a technology with uniquely
low public acceptance, especially in the wake of the Fukushima disaster (Rudolf et al., 2014).
There is uncertainty about its future status: some countries (e.g. the UK) are moving forward
with new nuclear plans despite some public opposition, while others (e.g. Germany) have
announced their intention to phase out nuclear power entirely (Wittneben, 2012). In addi-
tion to the CCS and nuclear options, one additional technology has recently seen a surge
of interest: concentrating solar power (CSP). There are currently 83 plants operating and 26
planned or under construction worldwide (NREL, 2013). Previous work has shown that in
principle, a fleet of CSP plants is able to provide baseload electricity, and could do so at
economically viable costs under some circumstances (Pfenninger et al., 2014). This leads to
the question whether CSP could therefore compete against nuclear as a supplier of clean
baseload power.
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A suitable location to assess this question is South Africa, which currently operates the
only nuclear power plant on the African continent. It also has one of the world’s foremost
solar resource potentials, with several CSP plants under construction and additional plants in
the planning stage. Furthermore, it is an example of an emerging economy with substantial
projected growth in power demand as well as insufficient current generation capacity. South
African industry and government are making the argument that nuclear energy is the only
viable baseload alternative to coal, and therefore essential for both long-term energy security
and climate change mitigation (Campbell, 2014a; Paton, 2014). The question investigated
here is therefore, how do nuclear and CSP as two possible low-emissions sources of baseload
power compare, for the example of South Africa? In addition to their cost, we compare the
two options on criteria including technology and fuel availability, their ability to contribute
to climate change mitigation and environmental protection, and the technical and financial
risks they may entail.
The paper proceeds as follow. The background section introduces the two technologies
and their role in South African energy policy in more detail, as well as the rationale behind
their comparison and other work addressing this issue. The methods section discusses the
data sources used, as well as the modeling and analytical approach taken to support the
comparison. Results are then presented from both the modeling work undertaken and from
a review of data drawn from the literature. The concluding discussion section examines the
implications for South African energy policy and its relevance for other world regions.
2. Background
Nuclear power generation uses heat released from a nuclear fission reaction to generate
steam that drives a turbine. Of importance for both costs and environmental impacts is
the complexity of the nuclear fuel cycle. On the so-called “front end” this includes mining,
milling, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication, and on the “back end”, temporary and
long-term storage, reprocessing, and transportation of spent fuel and waste, as well as the
decommissioning and remediation of reactors, processing facilities and mining sites. As of
2014, 388 nuclear reactors are operating worldwide, which is 50 less than the peak in 2002
(Schneider et al., 2014). 67 reactors are under construction, mostly in Asia, although some
of these have been listed as under construction for more than 20 years (Schneider et al.,
2014). The majority of currently operating reactors are generation II, i.e. the first commercial
reactor types built from the 1960s onward, while those under construction mostly represent
generation III/III+ plants which represent incremental improvements on generation II from
the 1990s onward (Grimes and Nuttall, 2010). Next generation (IV) reactors are at various
stages of development, but none are commercially available yet. These designs promise
better safety, the reduction or elimination of proliferation concerns, and fuel-cycle benefits
such as the ability to re-use existing depleted fuel (Abram and Ion, 2008). For example,
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proposed thorium reactors have received attention because of thorium’s abundance as well
as features such as minimal waste generation and safer operation (Schaffer, 2013). However,
while the cost of generation IV technologies is difficult to assess, there is no indication that
it will be lower than that of current-generation plants (Neij, 2008). Experiences such as the
failed Pebble Bed Modular Reactor show the pitfalls of developing next-generation nuclear
technology (Thomas, 2011).
CSP, like nuclear, uses heat to generate steam that drives a turbine. The heat source how-
ever is solar radiation. There are two different CSP technologies. The older and more estab-
lished technology concentrates sunlight onto pipes directly above rows of mirrors (parabolic
trough plants). The newer solar tower technology concentrates sunlight on a tower-mounted
receiver using mirrors called heliostats arranged around the tower. This is the technology
considered for comparison here. The thermal components of the plant have inherent thermal
inertia, which means that CSP plants can provide grid-stabilizing services similar to conven-
tional thermal plants (in contrast to PV, where power output can drop rapidly as passing
clouds shade the panels). This makes CSP easier to integrate in existing grids (Denholm and
Mehos, 2011). In addition to their inherent thermal inertia, CSP plants can also integrate
heat storage, allowing them to further decouple the time of power production from sunny
periods. Various storage technologies exist and are under continued development, with
molten salt tanks the most popular current choice. While typical recent plants do not nec-
essarily include a storage system, or have at best enough storage to run the plant for a few
hours after sunset, it has been demonstrated that 24-hour operation with larger storage sys-
tems is indeed possible in the Gemasolar plant in Spain. This capability makes CSP uniquely
different from both solar PV and wind power. Recent work has shown how in South Africa
specifically, CSP plants could cover the evening demand peak by making use of short-term
heat storage (Auret and Gauché, 2014; Silinga and Gauché, 2014). These studies found that
CSP can reduce the need for both variable output from baseload plants such as coal, and
for expensive and emissions-intensive gas or oil fired peaking plants.
South African electricity policy is driven by the Integrated Resources Plan (IRP) 2010-
2030, which details the government’s demand projections and plans for new and changed
capacity up to 2030 (South Africa Department of Energy, 2011). Its stated objectives are to
balance policy criteria including emissions mitigation, water use, local economic develop-
ment and security of supply. After the IRP’s promulgation in 2011, the intention is to update
it every two years. The first such update took place in 2013 (South Africa Department of
Energy, 2013), and the next one is expected in 2015. The original IRP foresaw deployment
of 9600 MW of nuclear capacity by 2030, but the 2013 update has reduced this by almost
half, to 4860 MW additional capacity, and recommends delaying any new build decision for
at least another decade. No decision on reactor technology has been made, but a gener-
ation III/III+ technology is the likely choice. The existing Koeberg nuclear plant (1800 MW,
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commissioned 1984) is assumed to remain online with an extended 40-year lifetime. The
reduction of nuclear capacity in the IRP coincides with rising costs for plants currently un-
der construction outside of Asia (see cost discussion and Table 1). Despite the cautionary
advice in the IRP, the government has announced that it is firmly committed to nuclear ex-
pansion within this decade (Campbell, 2014a). In contrast to the decreased role for nuclear
generation, the 2013 IRP update increases the base case projected installation of CSP from
1200 MW to 3300 MW in 2030 (this is still dwarfed by the planned PV capacity of 9770 MW).
This reflects two things: the rising attractiveness of renewables relative to nuclear, but also,
the higher perceived attractiveness of PV relative to CSP, primarily due to the rapid PV cost
reductions in recent years.
The South African government’s “peak, plateau and decline” (PPD) climate change mit-
igation objective foresees emissions peaking in the mid 2020s and declining from the mid
2030s onward (Government of South Africa, 2011). The 2013 IRP update assumes that the
electricity sector contributes about 45% to total emissions. Depending on the extent and
speed of decarbonization, different scenarios give a smaller role to coal power in 2050 (sum-
ming existing and new coal, from 40.9 GW in the constant emissions case to 21.3 GW in the
advanced decline case), and correspondingly, increase nuclear capacity (from 12.8 GW to
28.8 GW in the respective cases). CSP capacity remains similar in both cases, i.e. its role does
not significantly grow in the advanced decline case. This suggests that CSP is considered a
variable solar generation option with higher cost than PV, while nuclear power is considered
a potential replacement for coal as the backbone of a reliable power system. Generally, grids
relying heavily on both nuclear and renewables are considered impractical because nuclear
power plants have limits to their ramping and output range preventing them from balanc-
ing variable renewable output (Mez, 2012). Furthermore, due to the substantial capital cost,
nuclear power plant operators must aim at as high a capacity factor as possible (Koomey
and Hultman, 2007). Recent work has attempted to solve this issue by proposing hybrid
systems with geothermal heat or hydrogen storage (Forsberg, 2013), or with heat storage
between reactor and generators similar to how CSP plants operate (Denholm et al., 2012).
This would allow nuclear reactors to operate close to their optimal design point while giving
the flexibility necessary to integrate them with variable renewable generation.
Instead of trying to adapt nuclear power to fit into this new role, an alternative approach
is to replace it with a more suitable technology. While most CSP plants currently operating
or under construction are designed with relatively little storage (instead intended to serve
daytime or early evening demand), prior work has demonstrated the general feasibility of
CSP plants with storage providing baseload power (Pfenninger et al., 2014). Yet that study
did not address the possible future costs and the competitiveness of a CSP baseload solu-
tion against other technologies. Furthermore, the comparison between nuclear power and
a potential CSP baseload solution also warrants an examination of additional criteria. There
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thus are two immediate questions. First, could CSP compete against nuclear as a largely
emissions-free and reliable baseload provider? Second, how do the two technologies com-
pare on other important aspects such as their environmental impact and the operational risks
associated with them?
3. Methods and data
The analysis is based on data gathered from the literature and outlined in detail below.
Levelized power costs for nuclear power are computed by assuming appropriate values for
plant capacity factors. Investment costs and levelized power costs of baseload-capable CSP
plants are determined with the Calliope energy systems optimization modeling framework
(Pfenninger, 2014). Calliope constructs a cost-minimizing linear optimization problem, in
order to design an optimal configuration of power plants for the given constraints. It is used
here to simulate only CSP plants given a flat (baseload) demand, and not the rest of the
electricity system.
CSP power output is based on a central receiver plant model (Gauché et al., 2011) using
solar irradiance data from the SolarGIS database for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Geo-
Model Solar, 2012). The modeling approach allows planning the location and dimensioning
of CSP plants as well as simulating their operation, and analyzing scenarios with different
constraints and conditions. 30 possible sites are spread through those areas of South Africa
identified for CSP development, using land coverage data (JRC, 2010) to ensure they are
in suitable areas (see Figure 6). For all model runs, the complete three years of solar data
are used. The data is resampled to 12-hourly intervals in order to improve computational
tractability, but left at its original 1-hourly resolution for the “worst” week of data, with the
lowest solar irradiance values across the set of chosen sites (the week of 8th June 2009).
In order to size CSP plants, the Calliope model is run in planning mode to determine cost-
minimal plant configurations, freely choosing the installed power block capacity, solar field
size, receiver dimensions, and storage size for each possible site. The constraints are set
such that the total set of CSP plants must supply a stable baseload supply in each time step.
The data presented in the IRP 2013 update reflect a range of overnight capital costs for
nuclear from about 3800 to 7000 USD/kW based on various nuclear cost studies. The upper
range of nuclear capacity cost is uncertain. Plants under construction for which there are re-
cent cost estimates are Finland’sOlkiluoto-3 at about 7000 USD/kW and France’s Flamanville-
3 at about 6750 USD/kW (Schneider et al., 2014), both using Areva’s generation III+ European
Pressurized Reactor (EPR) reactor designs. The Hinkley Point C deal reached in the United
Kingdom in late 2013 amounts to 5000 GBP/kW or about 8300 USD/kW at 2014 exchange
rates (EDF Energy, 2013). Nuclear projects have frequently experienced cost overruns. For
reactors with a construction start between 1966 and 1977 in the United States, final costs
were between 209% and 381% above initial overnight cost estimates (Ramana, 2009). In
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addition, at the aggregate U.S. level, investment costs increased over time rather than ex-
hibiting learning effects or economies of scale (Ramana, 2009). Similarly, Grubler (2010)
found that in France, the real investment cost escalated by a factor of about 3.5 between
1974 and the post-1990 period. Reasons for this include the increasingly complex reactor
designs and safety requirements (MacKerron, 1992). For all these reasons, we assume a 0%
learning rate for nuclear, as given in Neij (2008). Considering the historical data this assump-
tion appears justified. Possible future generation IV plants are, at least initially, unlikely to
reduce in cost savings (Hultman et al., 2007). However, instead of technological learning, we
consider a range of uncertainty in overnight capital costs drawing both from plants currently
being constructed and from published estimates, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Capacity costs for nuclear power plants. A 7-year construction time is assumed.
The column including decommissioning assumes 430 USD/kW decommissioning costs












Olkiluoto-3 Plant - 7000 7430 Schneider et al. (2014)
Flamanville-3 Plant - 6750 7180 Schneider et al. (2014)
Hinkley Point C Con-
tract
- 8137 8567 EDF Energy (2013)
adjusted to 2012 USD
Taishan 1&2 Plant - 2407 2837 Beaupuy and Patel (2010)
















5530 - 8006 EIA (2013)
IRP 2013 Update Lit-
era-
ture
5800 - 8376 South Africa Department
of Energy (2013)
To assess overnight installation costs for CSP plants, the costs of four main components
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are used: the power block, the solar field, the receiver, and the storage system. This allows
explicit comparison of plants with substantially different configuration. We use the 2010 costs
reported in Kolb et al. (2011) as basis for our estimates. Of three projects currently under
construction in SA, cost information is available for two, Bokpoort at 11,300 USD/kW (ACWA
Power, 2014) and !Khi Solar One at 78,000 ZAR/kW, or 9516 USD/kW at 2012 exchange
rates (IDC, 2013). There is no information about cost or construction schedule overruns
(scheduled construction times are 2.25 and 2 years, respectively). Bokpoort is a parabolic
trough plant with 9 hours of storage, while !Khi is a central receiver plant with 2 hours of
storage. As shown in Table 2, we reproduce the reported costs for !Khi by assuming that
30% of total costs come from component costs, which we assume are 10% higher than the
base case costs from Kolb et al. (2011) (5% of which are due to inflation), and assuming that
financing costs were between 10% and 15% for this first of a kind (in South Africa) plant. This
also assumes a 2-year construction time with equal spread of costs over those two years.
Using this initial component cost estimate as a starting point for technological learning, we
consider several scenarios for future costs as shown in Table 3, with the resulting component
costs shown in Table 4. These technological learning scenarios are based on worldwide
deployment of central receiver plants with 2 hours of heat storage. An alternative version of
the “optimistic” learning scenario deploys plants with 8 hours of storage to assess the effect
of increased learning for storage technologies. The learning scenarios are exogenous to the
model analysis considered here, where storage size is freely optimized such that plants are
base-load capable, but it is assumed that for the global average fleet deployment, 2 hours
of storage is a good estimate.
Table 2: Reproducing reported investment costs for the !Khi Solar One plant from com-
ponent cost values modified from Kolb et al. (2011). No reported value for the receiver














Storage 30 33 333,333 11
Solar field 200 220 576,800 127
Power block 1350 1485 50,000 74
Receiver 200 220 311,472 69
Fixed costs (30%) 120
Total overnight 401
Investment (10 % interest) 445
Investment (15 % interest) 481
Investment (reported) 476
8
Table 3: Learning rate (LR) scenarios for CSP. The 2012 starting value of 2.5 GW was
chosen for all scenarios based on 2012 capacity according to NREL (2013). Learning
rates for the pessimistic scenario are adjusted downwards fromwhat Viebahn et al. (2011)
assumes. Learning rates for fixed costs own assumptions. “LR other” is the learning rate
for solar field, receiver, and storage.
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Base case (2012) 33 220 220 1485
Pessimistic (2020) 25.4 169.3 169.3 1307.3
Pessimistic (2030) 21.1 140.8 140.8 1195.2
Realistic 2h (2020) 21.0 140.0 140.0 1238.7
Realistic 2h (2030) 15.7 105.0 105.0 1103.6
Realistic 8h (2030) 16.3 140.0 140.0 1238.7
Realistic 8h (2030) 12.2 105.0 105.0 1103.6
Optimistic (2020) 12.2 105.0 105.0 1103.6
Optimistic (2030) 15.7 104.4 104.4 704.7
For nuclear power, the IRP 2013 update gives fixed operating and maintenance (O&M)
costs as 66.42 USD/kW-year, variable O&M as 0.368 cents/kWh, and fuel costs as 0.913
cents/kWh. These values are used as base case assumptions here. Some studies use sig-
nificantly lower values, however. For example, Du and Parsons (2009) quote fixed O&M
costs at 56 USD/kW-year, variable O&M costs at 0.042 cents/kWh, and fuel costs at 0.697
cents/kWh. To examine the sensitivity to fuel and O&M costs, we consider two additional
scenarios: a fuel cost of 0.5 cents/kWh, no variable O&M costs and a fixed O&M cost of 56
USD/kW-year, and a fuel cost of 1.5 cents/kWh with otherwise default values. For nuclear
decommissioning costs, an additional cost of 430 USD per kW capacity is added, based on
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the mean value for all water-cooled reactors from Bertel and Lazo (2003) and adjusted to
2012 USD. Decommissioning costs for CSP plants are assumed to be insignificant and there-
fore not considered. Furthermore, for CSP plants, there are no fuel costs, only O&M costs.
We take the highest central receiver plant IRP estimate for fixed O&M at 70 USD/kW-year,
with no variable O&M cost. Like the values used for nuclear plants, these values are higher
than those cited elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Kolb et al., 2011). They are assumed to fall
to 60 USD/kW-year in 2030 and 55 USD/kW-year in 2030.
The total life time of plants (both CSP and nuclear ones), as well as their life-time capacity
factors also affect overall cost of the power they produce. For nuclear plants, the complete
data from the IAEA’s PRIS database (IAEA, 2014) contains 239 currently operational reac-
tors and 101 permanently shut down ones. Based on this data, for all currently operating
plants, the lifetime mean capacity factor is 75.0%. More recent plants (construction started
after 1990) achieve a lifetime capacity factor of 79.5%. The mean operational lifetime of all
permanently shut down reactors was 26.4 years, while the mean lifetime so far of currently
operating reactors (time since start of commercial operation) is 27.3 years. For both capac-
ity factor and life time, higher values are often assumed in the literature (e.g., Sovacool,
2008), which appears unjustified given the IAEA’s operational data, although we can assume
that many currently operating reactors will operate longer than reactors shut down in the
past. Another factor is construction time. Depending on how long construction takes, real
investment costs can be significantly higher than overnight costs due to project financing
costs. The mean construction time (begin of construction to commercial operation date) for
all plants in the IAEA data is 7.1 years. For CSP plants, using data on currently operational
plants from NREL (2013) for which data is available (n=54), the mean construction time was
2.0 years. The construction time of a project affects both its attractiveness to investment
and the financing costs, but different financing sources are not further considered here. To
compute the cost of generated power, nuclear power plants are assumed to consume 5%
of their generated electricity internally, and CSP plants are assumed to consume 10%. 80%
and 90% capacity factors for nuclear plants are assumed, which matches the operational
performance of plants built since 1990 and serves as an estimate for possible future plants.
Nuclear plants are assumed to have a life time of 30 years, and CSP plants, 25 years. While
the economic book life time may differ from the physical life time, this difference is not con-
sidered in the analysis, as the book life is specific to a given country’s laws and regulations (in
this case, South Africa). In South Africa, it is unclear what type of financial (e.g. tax) incentives
might be offered to new nuclear plants, furthermore, it is unclear how the financial regime
for concentrating solar power plants could evolve by 2030.
Data on cost overruns for CSP projects specifically are not available, but Sovacool et al.
(2014) compare different electricity infrastructure projects. They find that 41%of solar projects
experience a cost overrun, and the mean overrun for those projects is 1%, while 97% of nu-
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clear projects experience a cost overrun, with a mean overrun of 117% for those projects.
Nuclear power plants are inherently large and complex projects, which makes them more
vulnerable to cost overruns (Jahren and Ashe, 1990), whereas CSP projects are smaller and
more flexible investments. Indeed, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) found that cost underestimation in
large infrastructure projects is systematic worldwide and can be “best explained by strate-
gic misrepresentation, i.e., lying”. Because individual CSP projects are orders of magnitude
smaller than nuclear plants, they can be expected to suffer to a lesser degree from such
effects. For this study, the total construction cost is calculated from overnight costs by as-
suming 4 and 7 year construction times for nuclear plants and a 2 year construction time for
CSP plants, and assuming that investment is spread evenly across each year of construction.
Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) and investment costs per installed capacity are cal-
culated ex-post for the modeled CSP plants. LCOE are also computed for nuclear power
plants with capacity factor assumptions as detailed above. In comparing costs, assumptions
on interest rates and construction times can have an important effect. In order to compare








n(1 + r)−n (1)
1
NC0(1 + i)
n is the cost paid in year n, which is based on the overnight cost C0 and
the share of cost for the year, assuming an equal spread of costs over the entire period of
construction (N is the total construction time in years). i is the inflation rate, and r is the
interest (discount) rate.
The impact of interest rate and construction time on investment costs is illustrated in
Figure 1. These real investment costs are then entered into the levelized electricity cost
calculations. An interest rate of 10% is assumed for both nuclear and CSP, so no assumptions
about different investment attractiveness or project financing models are made. Table 5



















































Figure 1: Impact of financing assumptions (interest rate) and construction time on real
investment cost relative to overnight capital cost. An inflation rate of 2% is assumed for
USD. The values used for CSP and nuclear plants are marked.
Table 5: Summary of model assumptions used in the technology comparison (also refer
to the other tables and the text for more detail).
Nuclear CSP
Capital costs Range of costs,
see Table 1
Range of costs, see Table 4
Construction time 4 years and 7
years
2 years
Interest rate 10% 10%
Life time 30 years 25 years
Availability 80% and 90% Endogenous to model, see results




Fixed 70 USD/kW-year (includes
variable costs, falling to 60
USD/kW-year in 2030 and 55
USD/kW-year in 2030)
Fuel costs 0.913 cents/kWh None
Decommissioning costs 430 USD/kW None (assumed negligible)
4. Results
4.1. Resource potential
The South African potential for CSP was estimated as 547.6 GW by Fluri (2009), for areas
within 20 km of the existing transmission grid, with a daily direct normal irradiance (DNI)
above 7 kWh/m2, and with suitable land cover and slope. This is an order of magnitude
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above the projected 2030 peak power demand of 61.2 GW (South Africa Department of
Energy, 2013). Trieb et al. (2014) gives land use for CSP as 250–550 m2/GWh, but South
Africa has large areas of low-productivity land, particularly in the desert regions with the
highest solar irradiance values, so this is not a constraint (although it will be in other world
regions). Rather than land, nuclear power plants primarily need fuel. Currently identified
uranium resources are sufficient for at least another 100 years at 2010 rates of consumption
(IAEA, 2012). This excludes undiscovered reserves, and also the ability of generation IV
reactors to use additional fissile material, extending the available fuel resource for hundreds
or even thousands of years (Schaffer, 2013). While fuel availability is therefore not an issue
at the global scale at least until the end of this century, the possibility of a domestic fuel
production cycle is an issue for national-level nuclear policy (discussed further below). 5%
of globally identified uranium resources are in South Africa, and another 5% in neighboring
Namibia (IAEA, 2012), although this has little strategic significance as there is currently no
Namibian or South African nuclear fuel processing industry. A concern sometimes cited is the
energy intensity of recovering lower grade uranium ores, but energy return on investment
remains well above 1 in all cases, and no shortage of economically recoverable uranian ores is
imminent (Schneider et al., 2013; Mudd, 2014). The available data suggest that for practical
purposes in South Africa, there are no fundamental technical constraints for either CSP or
nuclear power to potentially provide all or most of electricity demand.
4.2. Costs
For the purposes of comparison, we assume an 1000 MW power plant. Figure 2 shows
the range of overnight costs for CSP plants that together provide 1000 MW of baseload
capacity, along with the overall investment cost for that CSP plant fleet. These costs are for
plants dimensioned to supply stable baseload power throughout the three years modeled.
There is a significant range between individual plants (along the y-axis), but there is also the
potential for significant cost reductions, as illustrated by the different learning rate scenarios
along the x-axis. While it would be technically possible to construct a single CSP plant with a
solar field and storage facility large enough to provide stable baseload power throughout the
year, this is not as cost-effective as having multiple plants together provide this service (see
further discussion below). Therefore, the idea of a “metaplant”, which consists of several
individual plants together providing baseload capability is a useful concept to compare CSP
with nuclear power. In Figure 3, CSP investment costs are compared to those of nuclear
power. The CSP cost points represent the cost of such a metaplant, with different learning
rate assumptions, spread between the three model years 2012, 2020 and 2030. Note that
if plants are built sequentially rather than in parallel, it would be reasonable to assume that
later plants are cheaper due to additional technological learning, resulting in lower total costs
than those shown here. The nuclear costs are shown with two construction time assumptions
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Figure 2: Overnight construction costs for a baseload-capable CSP metaplant, together
with the individual CSP plants that together deliver baseload capability. For compari-
son, investment costs for a typical non-baseload capable reference plant with 2 hours of
storage is shown (corresponding to the dimensions of the !Khi Solar One plant currently
under construction in South Africa).
Figure 3 also shows a separate type of CSP plant labeled “dynamic baseload”, to which
we turn our attention next. Because the CSP plants modeled here depend entirely on the
sun (no fossil fuel hybridization is assumed), the overcapacity necessary to guarantee sta-
ble baseload power throughout the three modeled years results in high levelized electricity
costs. More realistically, a set of plants forming a metaplant could guarantee to meet a
certain minimum baseload power, but be designed to also produce additional power when
weather conditions are favorable. This is simulated by doubling the installed capacity to
2000 MW, but still guaranteeing a minimum of 1000 MW baseload. In other words, a CSP
metaplant guarantees to always deliver 1000 MW of power, but can also sell additional out-
put above 1000 MW, up to its total output of 2000 MW, depending on demand and weather
conditions. This leads to significantly lower levelized electricity costs. Figure 4 shows the dis-
patch schedule of CSP plants over a week with low irradiance, indicating how in the dynamic
baseload case, plants can still burst their output temporarily. Figure 5 shows the LCOE for
both technologies, again with varying assumptions. For nuclear power, a capacity factor of
80% and 90% is compared. For CSP plants, the capacity factor shown is calculated based
on the dispatch schedule determined by the planning model. The “dynamic baseload” case
moves projected 2030 CSP LCOEs in all scenarios well within the range of (baseload) nuclear
costs. Even in the strict baseload case, however, if favorable learning rate scenarios for CSP
and the higher end of the cost range for nuclear are assumed, baseload power from CSP
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Figure 3: Ranges of investment costs in 2012 USD for CSPmetaplants and nuclear plants.
The CSP metaplants are spread between 2012, 2020, and 2030 costs, for both regular
baseload and dynamic baseload configurations (see text). For nuclear plants, a compar-
ison assuming 4 years and 7 years of construction duration is shown. The two sources
of published estimates for African/South African plants are marked.
One advantage of CSP over nuclear is that several individual CSP plants can be built
instead of one large nuclear plant, thus spreading the financial, construction and operating
risk. Table 6 compares different constraints on the maximum installed capacity per site for
both the baseload and dynamic baseload configurations. If only 100 MW are allowed per
site, all sites must be included to reach the desired 1000 MW total capacity. On the other
hand, if no restriction is set, 5 sites are selected in the planning optimization. There is,
of course, a trade-off: selecting only few optimal sites would lead to higher vulnerability
towards adverse weather conditions at one location. The results from Table 6 suggest that
reducing from 8 to 5 sites brings little gain in cost, so there is a point at which it may be more
desirable to spread out sites in exchange for a slightly higher cost. In addition, the “500 MW,
close to grid” case only allows sites close to the existing power grid. This excludes some
sites with higher annual irradiance, and thus leads to an LCOE 1.7 cents/kWh higher (2012
costs) than in the unconstrained case. The cost difference can be interpreted such that for
this particular set of sites, picking sites further away from the existing transmission system
only makes economic sense if the added levelized cost of additional transmission lines is
below about 1.7 cents/kWh.
15


















Site 4 (500 MW)
Site 5 (311 MW)
Site 18 (219 MW)
Site 28 (232 MW)


















Site 4 (1000 MW)
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Figure 4: Dispatch of CSP plants during the week of lowest solar irradiance across all
possible sites. A: baseload plants, B: dynamic baseload plants.
Table 6: LCOE comparison for different allowed maximum installed capacities per site.
The “500 MW, close to grid” case additionally shows the cost increase by allowing only
sites close to the existing grid. All costs are in 2012 USD.
Used sites LCOE (2012) LCOE (2030)
Baseload (100 MW) 15 0.226 0.129
Baseload (200 MW) 10 0.215 0.122
Baseload (500 MW) 4 0.207 0.118
Baseload (no limit) 2 0.200 0.113
Baseload (500 MW, close to grid) 5 0.224 0.128
Dynamic baseload (400 MW) 8 0.130 0.077
Dynamic baseload (1000 MW) 4 0.127 0.076
4.3. Greenhouse gas emissions and environmental impacts
Assessing life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions is fraught with uncertainty, and published
estimates vary widely. For nuclear, Warner and Heath (2012) perform a harmonized meta-
analysis of published life cycle analyses and report amedian emissions intensity of 12 gCO2eq/kWh
with an interquartile range (IQR) of 6.8 to 24 gCO2eq/kWh, and a total range from 3.7 to 110
gCO2eq/kWh, for light water reactors (LWRs). They include additional reactor types in their
supplementary material: heavy water reactors show significantly worse results, gas-cooled
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Figure 5: Levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for CSP metaplants and nuclear plants.
Lines indicate progression of costs from 2012 to 2020 and 2030 for CSP metaplants un-
der different learning rate scenarios, for both classic baseload and dynamic baseload
configurations (see text). For nuclear power plants, a 7 year construction time is as-
sumed, and two scenarios with 80% and 90% capacity factors are compared. The two
nuclear power scenarios include the range of uncertainty spanned by the high and low
maintenance and fuel cost estimates (see text).
are based on only few studies. The LWR range is in the same order of magnitude as previ-
ous peer-reviewed meta-analyses (Sovacool, 2008; Fthenakis and Kim, 2007; Lenzen, 2008).
The primary energy used for fuel mining and processing can have a large influence on life-
cycle emissions. For example, Sovacool (2008) reports values from near zero to around 120
gCO2eq/kWh for the emissions contribution of the fuel cycle’s front end. Assuming that the
electricity system powering the nuclear fuel cycle is dominated by coal, the life cycle emis-
sions range in Warner and Heath (2012) rises to between 30 and 110 gCO2eq/kWh. This is
still well below the emissions intensity of fossil fuel power plants, but relevant given South
Africa’s stated plans for a renewed domestic fuel processing industry and the country’s cur-
rently coal-heavy power sector. Declining uranium ore grades also negatively affect future
nuclear plants’ emissions, but not by orders of magnitude as sometimes claimed (Warner
and Heath, 2012; Schneider et al., 2013). For CSP plants, Burkhardt et al. (2012) perform a
meta-analysis using light harmonization (excluding harmonization of embodied emissions of
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Figure 6: All available CSP sites, and those sites chosen in the scenario labelled
“Baseload (500 MW)” in Table 6. Includes, schematically, the currently existing trans-
mission system.
of 23 gCO2eq/kWh with an IQR of 15 to 26 gCO2eq/kWh, and a mean for central receivers
of 22 gCO2eq/kWh with an IQR of 16 to 29 gCO2eq/kWh. Overall, both CSP and nuclear
life cycle greenhouse gas emissions are much lower than those of fossil-fired plants (mean of
980 gCO2eq/kWh for all coal technologies according to Whitaker et al., 2012). Yet, nuclear
emissions may be up to an order of magnitude higher than those of CSP under worst-case
assumptions. It should be noted that assumptions such as plant life and capacity factors
can significantly affect reported emissions intensities. For example, the assumptions made
for the harmonization of nuclear plants in Warner and Heath (2012) (92% capacity factor, 40
years lifetime) may be too optimistic given the IAEA’s historical operational data (see above).
In addition to greenhouse gas emissions, energy production also has wider impacts on
human health and the environment, including water use, land use and biodiversity. All three
CSP plants currently under construction in SA use dry cooling (NREL, 2013), and the same
can be assumed for future projects. All of the nuclear plants currently operating or under
construction worldwide use wet cooling, primarily for safety reasons. Meldrum et al. (2013)
give harmonized life-cycle water withdrawal and consumption (i.e. the portion of withdrawn
water “not returned to the immediate water environment”). The following figures are their
median estimates for life cycle water use. Depending on the cooling technology the with-
drawal for nuclear is between 1297 and 47197 gallons/MWh (consumption: 544 - 864 gal-
lons/MWh). For dry-cooled CSP central receiver plants, withdrawal and consumption is 186
gallons/MWh, for dry-cooled parabolic trough plants, 238 gallons/MWh. For nuclear plants,
almost all water is used in the fuel cycle and plant cooling, while for dry-cooled CSP, almost
all water is used during plant construction. This assessment does not take into account wa-
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ter quality issues, such as the remediation of uranium mill tailing ponds. According to Mudd
(2014), mine rehabilitation frequently shows poor success and leads to problems including
acid drainage, erosion, public health risks and constrained land use challenges (Mudd, 2014).
However, data on direct ecological impacts of either technology are scarce. An appraisal of
avian deaths associated with different power generation technologies found similar rates
of death for wind and nuclear power (Sovacool, 2009), but there is no data for CSP plants.
Both CSP and nuclear are large-scale construction projects, with all the accompanying envi-
ronmental impacts. Nuclear power has the additional unresolved issue of long-term storage
for spent nuclear fuel with its associated environmental and health risks, and the difficulties
of finding suitable storage sites that are publicly acceptable (Sjoberg and Drottz-Sjoberg,
2009).
4.4. Other risks
There are additional risks with both CSP and nuclear plants both today and in the future.
The key risk with CSP is twofold: first, costs may not reduce to the degree suggested by
the learning rate analyses given above. While the results show that CSP could nevertheless
be cost-competitive to nuclear in some cases, it may still be uncompetitive in the wider re-
newable energy market, or against fossil fuels in absence of strong climate mitigation com-
mitments. Second, CSP depends on variable solar irradiance, and therefore on possible
changes in irradiance trends or extreme events affecting irradiance over a period of days or
weeks. Infrequent periods of low irradiance (which may not show up in the 3 years of data
used here) could be countered by hybrid plants that can also burn fossil fuels or biomass,
or the ability to charge the plants’ heat storage from the grid (Silinga and Gauché, 2014).
Furthermore, if only individual sites are affected, the overall capability of a well-distributed
metaplant to deliver power would only marginally be affected. Figure 7 shows thirty years
of total daily DNI across the 30 possible sites, based on CM-SAF data (Mueller et al., 2012;
Amillo et al., 2014). It suggests that the three chosen years are well within the range of varia-
tion over these decades, and that the year 2009 is even a particularly bad year (in the month
of June). A major advantage of CSP over nuclear power is that CSP plants can be built at
a much smaller scale. The assumption in this paper is to provide 1000 MW of baseload ca-
pacity, and that this requires either a single nuclear plant or a variable number of CSP plants
(while technically possible, no small nuclear plants are available on the market yet). Splitting
investment into several smaller projects may spread out or reduce various other risks, such
as those of corruption, or construction delays at specific sites.
The possibility of a catastrophic accident is one of the reasons for popular opposition to
nuclear power, as are the health risks associated with radiation (Christodouleas et al., 2011).
The idea of “normal accidents” introduced by Perrow (1984) is that due to their inherent
complexity and tight coupling, a residual risk of catastrophic failure cannot be prevented
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B. Daily direct normal irradiance in June (Winter), 1983-2013
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Figure 7: Daily DNI data for the months of June and December, averaged over all 30
possible sites, for the years 1983-2013. Each line represents one year, and the three
years used for the detailed site selection are marked in color.
in systems such as nuclear reactors. This fact was once again demonstrated by the 2011
Fukushima disaster. A further risk, both technical and financial in nature, is that there is cur-
rently no long-term solution for nuclear waste. Spent fuel rods are stored on-site at reactors
in many countries (including South Africa’s Koeberg reactor) due to a lack of secure storage
facilities. Irrespective of how improved reactor designs may affect the safety of future nu-
clear plants, and irrespective of new ways to deal with nuclear waste, CSP plants (like other
renewable energy sources) do not suffer from such problems. The most common principles
of liability for nuclear power, which SA follows, place liability in case of accidents on the
operator of a nuclear power plant, but also limit the operator’s maximum liability (Republic
of South Africa, 1999). Without this liability cap, higher insurance costs could follow, which
may discourage investment in nuclear. The cap has therefore been called an implicit subsidy
(Dubin and Rothwell, 1990), remaining hidden in most cost assessments (including the one
performed in this study). Furthermore, arguments have been made that capping liability
leads to inadequate incentives for safe reactor designs and operating procedures (Trebil-
cock and Winter, 1997; Eberl and Jus, 2012). Decommissioning costs are uncertain and the
value used in this study may be too optimistic for problematic cases or accident remediation.
The Japanese government has estimated the cost of decommissioning the four Fukushima
power plants alone at 13.6 Billion USD (Aoki and Rothwell, 2013), which, combined with
a decommissioning before their planned end of life, will drastically increase the levelized
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power costs for those reactors. In summary, nuclear power has numerous potential technical
and financial risks for which insufficiently accurate data are available.
Finally, there is the the degree to which either nuclear or CSP are vulnerable to climate
change. Existing nuclear plant designs rely on wet cooling and thus need either a seaside
location, potentially making them vulnerable to sea level rise (Kopytko and Perkins, 2011),
or a nearby river, making them vulnerable to hydrological flow changes or high surface water
temperatures (Förster and Lilliestam, 2010; van Vliet et al., 2012). CSP plants are vulnerable
to changing irradiance patterns or prolonged periods of low irradiance driven by climate
change. Without further work, little can be said on whether and how these vulnerabilities can
be addressed, and how severe they potentially are under different climate change scenarios.
4.5. Indirect economic effects
There are also considerations of local economic development and job creation. One of the
South African government’s stated goals is to re-establish a domestic nuclear fuel produc-
tion cycle. However, establishing a fuel production cycle that is economically viable would
require nuclear deployment on the order of 10,000 MW (Campbell, 2014b). For the United
States, Wei et al. (2010) give average job-years per GWh of 0.23 for CSP, and 0.14 for Nu-
clear, but assuming high availability for nuclear and low availability for CSP. So the jobs
per GWh, if both have similar (baseload) availability, may in reality be closer to each other.
However, many of the nuclear-related jobs that accrue in the U.S. may not accrue in South
Africa because of the limited domestic nuclear industry relying substantially on imported
experts and technology. In contrast, South Africa has been actively developing technolo-
gies in the CSP area and with more domestic deployment experience, it might become a
CSP technology exporter, rather than an importer as in the case of nuclear. Furthermore,
evidence suggests that market-related jobs outnumber those in manufacturing in other in-
dustries (Dicken, 2007). This suggests that the promotion of a fledgling domestic technology
market alongside its service and support suppliers may be a more viable economic strategy
than the large-scale import of an established technology.
5. Discussion and conclusion
We compare nuclear and concentrating solar power as baseload providers, from the per-
spective of resource potential, costs, emissions and other environmental impacts, risks and
vulnerabilities. The results suggest that in terms of cost, baseload-capable CSP could be-
come competitive with nuclear power by 2030 if it sees sufficient deployment to drive costs
down, and in some cases (at the higher end of the nuclear cost scale), it can already be com-
petitive now. Furthermore, CSP plants are a smaller investment with lower environmental
and financial risks. Thus, the results indicate that in countries with substantial solar resource,
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Table 7: Summarized comparison between the two technologies. See results discussed above for details.
Nuclear CSP Likely development
Resource potential No practical limits for at least the next 100 years No practical limits, sufficient land
with high solar resource available in
South Africa
Newer generation reactors
would further extend the
nuclear resource by hundreds
of years
Costs Wide range of costs but most of them high,
unlikely to fall substantially, and historically
liable to cost overruns





Greenhouse gas emissions Reported values from below 10 gCO2eq/kWh
to above 100 gCO2eq/kWh, most likely real
value below 50 gCO2eq/kWh
Similar order of magnitude as
nuclear
Nuclear emissions would rise
if increasingly lower-grade
uranium is used
Other environmental effects Mining and remediation, decommissioning,
substantial cooling water use
No major issues currently known,
apart from land use from heliostats,
water use lower and primarily in
construction rather than operation
More studies on the effect of
CSP plants on wildlife may
yet reveal ecological damage
Risks Risk of nuclear accidents and contamination,
severe financial risks, liabilities of
decommissioning costs, may face political and
popular opposition, climate vulnerabilities due
to coastal locations and water use
Risk of low irradiance periods,
climate vulnerabilities due to
changing weather patterns
Uncertain future climate
effects, cost uncertainty for
both could change relative
attractiveness
Ease of deployment Slow regulatory and construction process based
on global experience so far, negative public
opinion may block or delay deployment
Fast and timely construction based
on global experience so far, less
likely to face public opposition
Investment prospects for CSP
may become more favorable
as construction and operating
experience increases
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like South Africa, CSP could be a viable alternative as a baseload providing technology.
Table 7 summarizes the comparison on the other criteria.
Future work could improve on the analysis in several ways. The consideration of climate
variation and the vulnerability of both technologies is an important question for longer-term
planning. Maintenance downtimes are not explicitly considered in this study for either CSP or
nuclear plants, although the availability for both does not exceed about 90%. Their consid-
eration might be favorable to CSP, as CSP plants would generally be smaller (so the capacity
going offline at any given moment would be small), furthermore, nuclear power plants, due
to their complexity, can be expected to be more maintenance-intensive. However, more
work would be needed to quantify their effect.
There are also several key uncertainties that could significantly affect the analysis. Firstly,
there is uncertainty in the cost data used here. In the case of nuclear, cost data from China
suggest that plants can be built at significantly lower costs. On the other hand, insufficient
information on these cost data is available, and it is possible that they do not cover the full
costs, or that savings achieved will translate to higher operational costs or lower availabilities.
The future costs of both technologies are uncertain, yet historical evidence suggests that
nuclear costs do not fall over time, while CSP costs could significantly decrease as learning
takes place (but that is also uncertain). Furthermore, we have considered the physical lifetime
of plants, but not the potential impact different economic “book” lifetimes would have on
the analysis, due to a lack of conclusive data to underpin such a study for South Africa. Future
comparative work between different tax and incentive regimes could analyze their effect on
the relative investment value of the two options discussed here. In addition to cost data
uncertainty, further uncertainties exist in input data used here, including the solar irradiance
data (for CSP), technology performance data (for both CSP and nuclear), and emissions data,
as discussed above. Finally, the integration of CSP and nuclear plants into future power
grids with potentially high shares of variable renewable generation (wind and solar PV) may
significantly affect the costs and feasibilities reported here. This topic warrants more in-depth
analysis using fully-fledged power system models better able to represent the operational
implications of adding baseload generation. For example, the relative inflexibility and high
capital cost of nuclear plants make it possible that their relative competitiveness to CSP
would decrease when considering the full power system dynamics.
There are, of course, other technological possibilities: for example, a breakthrough in
electricity storage technologies, coupled with continuing cost decreases of wind and solar
PV, could accelerate the transition to a new paradigm of power systems and leave both CSP
and nuclear unable to compete. The technical analysis performed here – the ability of solar
power plants with integrated storage to provide stable baseload power – would hold equally
well for PV power plants combined with a form of battery storage. Yet CSP plants have
other unique properties, for example, a contribution to grid stability due to their spinning
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turbine, so they may still have applications in any case. In Southern Africa specifically, there is
some evidence for increasing regional collaboration, for instance through the treaty signed to
deliver power to South Africa from the proposedGrand Inga dam in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (Manson, 2014). This and similar projects could provide another substantial source
of emissions-free baseload power to the entire region, but it is unclear whether and how
soon such projects might be realized. Finally, there is the also possibility of technological
development leading to smaller, safer, and cheaper nuclear power reactors, but again, it is
uncertain if and when such technology would be available.
Technology choice is often not driven by costs or perceived environmental benefits. For
example, there is evidence of a lock-in effect, i.e. that countries with existing nuclear power
capacity continue investing in it (Csereklyei, 2014). On the other hand, strategic energy
policy may suggest one technology over another for reasons to do with long-term energy
security or other governmental interests. The results presented here suggest that with a
moderate deployment of non-baseload capable CSP worldwide, the cost of CSP technology
may have fallen enough by 2030 to make baseload-capable CSP generation economically
competitive with nuclear power. Given these results, a cautious approach of delaying in-
vestment decisions into new nuclear power plants in South Africa may be prudent, which
indeed was also suggested by the IRP 2013 update. Globally, this also means that as coun-
tries reach higher and higher shares of renewables, and start experiencing difficulties with
grid integration and balancing, cheaper, fully dispatchable or baseload-capable CSP plants
will be able to ease pressure on existing grids. The results presented here should be equally
valid for other regions with an abundant solar resource. For regions without the necessary
solar resource, in particular Europe, domestic CSP production is not an option, but imports
from neighboring deserts may be (this has been shown to be economically feasible including
the added transmission costs, e.g. in Williges et al., 2010). Ultimately, the question of tech-
nology choice is also one of societal and political decision-making on which risks are more
desirable, but the results and data presented here can help shape those decisions.
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